The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisors Rescue the Retail Market? by Edwards, Benjamin P.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 93
Issue 1 FinTech's Promises and Perils Article 3
3-16-2018
The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can
Robo-Advisors Rescue the Retail Market?
Benjamin P. Edwards
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Computer Law
Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Benjamin P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisors Rescue the Retail Market?, 93 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 97
(2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol93/iss1/3
??
???????????????????????????????????????? ????
???????????????????????????????? ??????
??????????? ?????????
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
?? ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ???
??? ?????????????? ????????? ???????????????????? ????? ????????????
???????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
“When people are paying 2 percent in fees — that’s
criminal?? ? ???????????????????????????????????????
????????????
????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???????? ???? ???????? ???????? ?????? ???? ?????? ?????? ??????????? ????
???????? ??? ??????? ????????? ??????????? ?????? ???????? ???? ????????? ???????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
???? ???? ???????? ???? ???????? ????????? ???? ??????????????? ???????? ??????? ??? ??????? ????? ??????????
?????????? ????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????Tailoring Retirement Plans to Companies with a Handful of Workers? ????
????? ?????? ???? ??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
???????
??? ?Id.
??? ?Id.
98 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 93:1
to have $10 or $20 million in assets to offer a plan, Honest Dollar made 
retirement plans available for just $8 a month per employee.4
Honest Dollar embraced technology to offer automated investment 
advice—a model some refer to as “robo-advisers.”5 Honest Dollar provided 
small businesses with retirement savings plans by focusing on the basics 
and by offering low-cost passive investing options.6 The platform relied on 
Vanguard’s low-cost funds and gave “participants few choices about how 
their money will be invested.”7 In 2016, Goldman Sachs recognized the 
business model’s potential and acquired Honest Dollar for an undisclosed 
amount.8 Today’s rapidly growing automated investment advice firms 
make it possible for small businesses and even start-ups to offer high quali-
ty retirement savings vehicles to employees.
In recent years Wall Street firms have paid increasing attention to au-
tomated investment advice firms.9 These innovative firms offer investment 
advice through digital platforms.10 Their websites allow users to complete 
surveys about their preferences and financial situation.11 The automated 
investment advice firms then turn and use that information to create appro-
priately personalized portfolios.12
Consumer interest in automated investment advice continues to grow. 
One informed observer recently predicted that automated investment advis-
4. Id.
5. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) uses the term “digital investment 
advice” to capture the same types of activities. FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 2
(2016), 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8FK-
6KSF] [hereinafter FINRA, DIGITAL].
6. Cowley, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Liz Moyer, Goldman Sachs to Buy Honest Dollar, a Small Plan Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
14 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/business/dealbook/goldman-sachs-to-buy-honest-
dollar-a-small-plan-start-up.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S5KX-89WU]. Similarly, BlackRock, the 
world’s largest asset manager, snapped up FutureAdvisor in 2015.
9. See Alessandra Malito, In the Wake of BlackRock’s FutureAdvisor Deal, Which Independent 
Robo-Adviser Will be Bought Next?, INVESTMENTNEWS (Aug. 27, 2015, 2:23 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150827/FREE/150829915/in-the-wake-of-blackrocks-
futureadvisor-deal-which-independent-robo [https://perma.cc/YD23-LX3A].
10. See Paul Sullivan, The Computer as Financial Planner, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/20/your-money/the-computer-as-a-financial-planner.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZUF9-GGQS].
11. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 221 (2017) 
[hereinafter Edwards, Conflicts] (“Financial technology may disrupt much of the traditional investment 
advice business by allowing algorithms to select appropriate portfolios for persons that meet particular 
characteristics.”).
12. FINRA, DIGITAL, supra note 5, at 3 (“Algorithms are core components of digital investment 
advice tools. They use various financial models and assumptions to translate data inputs into suggested 
actions at each step of the advice value chain.”).
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ers may manage $2 trillion in assets by 2020.13 Today, the two largest au-
tomated investment advice providers now manage approximately seventeen 
billion in assets while continuing to expand their capabilities.14
These automated investment advice firms may disrupt and improve 
the market for investment advice and finally allow modern technology to 
make financial intermediation more efficient.15 For a variety of reasons, 
costs in the sector have remained abnormally high.16 One study found that 
“the unit cost of intermediation is about as high today as it was at the turn 
of the twentieth century.”17 The sector’s puzzlingly high costs have persist-
ed even though technology “should lower the physical transaction costs of 
buying, pooling, and holding financial assets.”18
This article reviews the tremendous market-disrupting potential auto-
mated investment advice firms present as well as some challenges and pos-
sible roadblocks ahead. The article opens by discussing the conflicted-
advice problem for the retail investing market and the cast of professionals 
that now serve this market in Part I. In Part II, the article reviews automat-
13. TERESA EPPERSON ET AL., A.T. KEARNEY, HYPE VS. REALITY: THE COMING WAVES OF 
“ROBO” ADOPTION 26 (2015),
https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/7132014/Hype+vs.+Reality_The+Coming+Waves+of+R
obo+Adoption.pdf/9667a470-7ce9-4659-a104-375e4144421d [https://perma.cc/87Z7-CHMT] (“Be-
tween shifts from traditional advisors and ‘new investors,’ [about] $2 trillion will be managed under 
robo-advisors by 2020.”).
14. See Frank Chaparro, Betterment Has Taken Its First Step Into One of the Hottest Areas of 
Investing, BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2017, 9:00 AM) http://www.businessinsider.com/betterment-
sustainable-investment-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/GX83-QQ4W] (“Betterment, the largest roboadviser 
with $9.5 billion under management, has taken its first step into the world of sustainable investing”); 
Robo Adviser Wealthfront Now Offering Loans, Not Just Advice, INVESTMENTNEWS (Apr. 19, 2017, 
4:37 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170419/free/170419903/robo-adviser-
wealthfront-now-offering-loans-not-just-advice [https://perma.cc/9363-KCFA] (“Wealthfront Inc. said 
in a blog post Wednesday that it will offer loans, calling the move a first among robo-advisers, which 
are known for wealth management using automated investing platforms.”); Jason Zweig et al., Talk Is 
Cheap: Automation Takes Aim at Financial Advisers—and Their Fees, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2016, 
4:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/talk-is-cheap-automation-takes-aim-at-financial-advisersand-
their-fees-1501099600 [https://perma.cc/X5U2-WGQL] (“Betterment and Wealthfront say they manage 
$9.7 billion and $7.1 billion in assets, respectively, up from $5.1 billion and $3.5 billion a year ago.”).
15. Financial intermediaries connect savers to investment opportunities. They include banks, 
brokerage firms, investment advisers and others. For a definition of financial intermediaries, see Kristin 
N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 187 n.2 
(2013), who defines “financial intermediaries” as “privately owned and controlled businesses that 
provide fundamental financial services to financial market participants.”
16. See Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577 (2015) (explaining 
that “[b]ecause fees are revenue to the intermediaries to whom they are paid, intermediaries prefer laws, 
norms, market structures, and other institutional arrangements that entail higher, not lower, transaction 
fees”).
17. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and 
Measurement of Financial Intermediation, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408, 1413 (2015).
18. Id. at 1434 (“A potential explanation is oligopolistic competition but the link between market 
power and the unit cost of intermediation is not easy to establish.”).
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ed investment advice’s disruptive potential and explores some potential 
regulatory and policy concerns about automated investment advice.
I. THE CONFLICTED-ADVICE PROBLEM
In recent decades, financial intermediation has changed in significant 
ways. American retail investors only rarely buy stocks in individual com-
panies.19 Instead, most now purchase other securities—shares in funds. 
These institutional intermediaries dominate the securities markets.20
These institutional intermediaries compete against each other for retail 
investor capital.21 Often, capital flows to particular institutional intermedi-
aries because of conflicts in the market for financial advice.22 Many institu-
tional intermediaries gather capital by making payments to financial 
advisers when they steer their clients into particular investment decisions.23
This system, and the players that operate within it, now contributes to the 
retirement crisis.
A. The Retirement Crisis
For decades, “a three-legged stool” has supported Americans through 
retirement.24 Stable retirements were supported by Social Security, em-
ployer pensions, and personal savings.25 As employers moved away from 
defined-benefit pensions and toward offering defined-contribution plans, 
19. See Anita K. Krug, Uncertain Futures in Evolving Financial Markets, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
1209, 1211 (2016) (“There are thousands upon thousands of mutual funds and other publicly offered 
investment funds, which, as the dominant investment repositories of retail investors’ retirement capital 
and other assets, have come to play a crucial role in the securities markets.”).
20. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the 
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009) (“The last thirty years or so have brought a rapid 
shift toward institutionalization in the financial markets in the United States—in other words, a shift 
toward investment by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, bank trust departments, and 
the like.”).
21. Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 198–99.
22. Id.
23. See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement Savings and 
the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 64 (2015) (“Financial advisers, includ-
ing brokers (who have no fiduciary duty to their clients), make the problem worse. Most of them are 
compensated based on (entirely legal) kickbacks.”).
24. See, e.g., Larry DeWitt, Research Note #1: Origins of the Three-Legged Stool Metaphor for 
Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (May 1996), http://www.ssa.gov/history/stool.html 
[https://perma.cc/8U7H-ZW93] (“Social Security benefits are described as the ‘foundation’ upon which 
individuals can build additional retirement security through company or personal pensions and through 
savings and investment. For many years, an older metaphor was used to make this point. Social Security 
benefits were said to be one leg of a three-legged stool consisting of Social Security, private pensions 
and savings and investment.”).
25. Id.
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the employer pension leg collapsed.26 Without employer-sponsored de-
fined-benefit pension plans, most retirees will depend entirely on personal 
savings and Social Security. Unfortunately, the personal savings leg seems 
unlikely to provide much support for most retirees.27
Describing the personal savings leg as “weak” understates the prob-
lem. The United States now faces a looming retirement crisis.28 According 
to one recent survey, a third of Americans have no retirement savings.29 In
instances where Americans have retirement savings, they often do not have 
significant assets. Over half of the population has less than $10,000 in as-
sets stowed away.30 Financial insecurity may be particularly concentrated 
in minority communities. Over half of “black and Hispanic families have 
no retirement account savings.”31
Americans approaching or entering retirement often fail to appreciate 
the need for savings. One report found that Americans tended to signifi-
cantly underestimate their actual need for savings.32 Workers that do not 
calculate how much they will need often estimate that they will need be-
tween $250,000 to $499,000 for retirement.33 In contrast, workers that cal-
culate their likely needs for a comfortable retirement estimate that they will 
need between $500,000 and $750,000.34
26. Richard L. Kaplan & Kate S. Poorbaugh, What’s the Matter with Retirement Savers?, 47 
CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1314 (2015) (“Employer-provided pensions as independent income streams in 
retirement rather than facilitated employee savings vehicles have largely disappeared.”).
27. See Amy B. Monahan, Employers as Risks, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 753 (2014) (“Perhaps 
the primary risk related to retirement is simply the risk of inadequate savings. Individuals who are left 
to make savings decision on their own may, for a variety of reasons, save at a level that is insufficient to 
support them in retirement.”).
28. See Deepa Das Acevedo, Addressing the Retirement Crisis with Shadow 401(k)s, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 38, 38 (2016), 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4723&context=ndlr [https://perma.cc/X5W2-
3JWH] (“[T]he retirement crisis may prove to be one of the most damaging developments facing con-
temporary America. It invites procrastination, it’s remarkably immune to class and industry distinctions, 
and it’s actually two exceedingly complex problems.”).
29. Elyssa Kirkham, 1 in 3 Americans Has Saved $0 for Retirement, TIME (Mar. 14, 2016), 
http://time.com/money/4258451/retirement-savings-survey/ [https://perma.cc/K5R8-XRAK].
30. Id.
31. MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POLICY INST., THE STATE OF AMERICAN RETIREMENT: HOW
401(K)S HAVE FAILED MOST AMERICAN WORKERS 17 (2016), http://www.epi.org/files/2016/state-of-
american-retirement-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TTY-WS9Z].
32. ALICIA WILLIAMS & JONATHAN JACKSON, AARP RESEARCH CTR., 2014 RETIREMENT 
CONFIDENCE SURVEY: A SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS FROM RESPONDENTS AGE 50+, at 8
(2015), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/surveys_statistics/econ/2015/2014-RCS-
Respondents-50Plus-res-econ.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3NQ-8AYN].
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id.
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The need for personal savings may be particularly great for younger 
generations. Many observers worry that the Social Security leg of retire-
ment support will either collapse or offer reduced benefits in the future.35
B. The Advice Problem
Although professional assistance from qualified financial advisers 
might help many save for their future, most do not use financial advisers. 
One survey found that only 28% of Americans surveyed worked with a 
financial adviser.36 The investors that do use financial advisers often pay 
large fees, undercutting their ability to save for retirement.37 The White 
House Council of Economic Advisers conservatively estimated the total 
cost of conflicted financial advice at $17 billion annually.38
How much and how to pay financial advisers remains controversial. 
Many financial advisers assist clients with far more than asset allocation 
decisions.39 Some help clients create savings plans and provide significant 
counseling about how to achieve savings goals. A financial adviser that 
provides poor and conflicted asset allocation advice while convincing a 
client to increase her savings rate may cause a client to accumulate signifi-
cant wealth—despite pitching high-fee products and inefficiently allocating 
assets. In contrast, an adviser who provides high-quality asset allocation 
advice but does not increase a client’s savings rate may not generate as 
much wealth accumulation.40
The available pool of financial advisers leaves much to be desired. 
Many self-styled financial advisers receive commission compensation and 
are paid to steer clients toward high-fee products.41 The dangers posed by 
35. See Doug Bandow, Commentary, Social Security’s Coming Crash: The Certain End of 
Entitlement, CATO INST. (Oct. 20, 2009), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/social-
securitys-coming-crash-certain-end-entitlement [https://perma.cc/3JEQ-52U7].
36. BLACKROCK, DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE: ROBO ADVISORS COME OF AGE 3 (2016), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-at/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-investment-advice-
september-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTB8-HZ8V].
37. See Anne M. Tucker, Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen Shareholders, 125 
YALE L.J. F. 163, 181 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/locked-in-the-competitive-
disadvantage-of-citizen-shareholders [https://perma.cc/J9PJ-4JW4] (“High fees can consume up to 
thirty percent of an investor’s return on a thirty-year investment.”).
38. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFFECTS OF 
CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (2015) (“the aggregate annual cost of 
conflicted advice is about $17 billion each year” for retirement savers).
39. See Tom Baker & Benedict G. C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial 
Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16–17), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932189 [https://perma.cc/F5W7-WFBW].
40. Id.
41. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary 
Duty Make a Material Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105, 121 (2014) (“These distorting incentives 
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this type of commission-driven advice have been known to policy makers 
for decades.42 Because much of their compensation comes from selling 
products, they may not have adequate incentives to provide competent 
financial counseling and planning services
Despite the well-established dangers, ordinary investors regularly fail 
to recognize real risks. Instead of realizing that a financial adviser may 
receive commission compensation, more than half of investors in their 
sixties or seventies incorrectly believe the adviser provides her advice for 
free.43 One audit study sent “mystery shoppers” with well-diversified and 
low-fee portfolios to meet with commission compensated financial advis-
ers.44 Even though the financial advisers overwhelmingly recommended 
switching to the types of higher-fee funds that independent experts counsel 
against, most of the mystery shoppers left thinking that it would be a good 
idea to use the same advisers to manage their own money.45
Automated investment advice firms may mitigate the conflicted-
advice problem and expand access to investment advice. The best platforms 
will likely provide planning tools to help clients increase their savings 
rates. By providing greater access to advice at a lower cost, these new firms 
may reach persons that traditional financial advice firms have not yet 
served. Of course, the quality of an automated investment advice tool’s 
recommendations depends on the persons that create the automated invest-
ment advice tool. If large firms create automated investment advice tools 
that simply recommend a firm’s own, higher-fee funds, automated invest-
ment advice may not result in improved asset allocations.46
have long been recognized as creating material conflicts between the Broker’s interests and the client’s
interests.”).
42. An SEC committee noted the danger posed by these conflicts of interest over twenty years 
ago. SEC, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES 7–8 (1995), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt [https://perma.cc/C23K-4BK2] (“Of particular concern is 
the practice of firms offering higher payouts when [financial advisers] sell proprietary mutual funds 
instead of funds of a similar class managed by outside investment companies.”).
43. Ben Steverman, Why You Still Can’t Trust Your Financial Adviser, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 
2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-06-07/fiduciary-rule-fight-brews-
while-bad-financial-advisers-multiply [https://perma.cc/Q3JT-JL25] (“According to a Cerulli Associ-
ates survey last year, a majority of investors in their 60s and 70s either aren’t sure what their fees are or 
believe incorrectly that they pay nothing for advice.”).
44. See generally Sendhil Mullainathan et al., The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17929, 2012), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17929.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MRS-KRZG].
45. Id.
46. See FINRA, DIGITAL, supra note 5, at 6 (“Firm vs. client conflicts, however, may remain 
present for both financial professional- and client-facing digital advice tools, for example if a firm 
offers products or services from an affiliate or receives payments or other benefits from providers of the 
products or services.”).
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C. Advice-Givers Serving the Expanding Retail Market
Much of the confusion around investment advice may flow from the 
fragmented regulatory structure for providing investment advice.47 Tradi-
tional financial advisers operate within a variety of regulatory structures. 
The actual duties they owe to their clients depends on the type of product 
sold, the compensation received, the source of the client’s funds, and other 
factors.48
1. Brokers
Commission-compensated stockbrokers (Brokers) regularly market 
themselves as trustworthy financial advisers.49 Even though most investors 
mistakenly believe that brokers owe a duty to provide financial advice in a 
client’s best interest,50 brokers ordinarily only owe a duty to provide “suit-
able” advice.51 The “suitability” standard allows financial advisers to sell 
clients “suitable” investments—even if they are not necessarily in their 
client’s best interests.52 After a transaction closes, the law often imposes no 
47.  See Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment
Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47, 52 (2014) (discuss-
ing regulatory fragmentation); Christine Lazaro, The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False 
Distinction Between Brokers and Investment Advisors, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381, 411 (2013) (“More 
and more investors do not even realize that there is a distinction between brokers and investment advis-
ers.”).
48.  Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 47, at 49 (“In many cases, a single financial adviser may wear
several hats. In each role, the financial adviser owes different duties to retail customers depending on 
the type of compensation being received, product sold, and locality.”).
49.  See generally Joseph C. Peiffer & Christine Lazaro, Major Investor Losses Due to Conflicted
Advice: Brokerage Industry Advertising Creates the Illusion of a Fiduciary Duty: Misleading Ads Fuel 
Confusion, Underscore Need for Fiduciary Standard, 22 PIABA B.J. 1 (2015).
50.  SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS at i (2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX8V-A7YH] [hereinafter 
SEC, FIDUCIARY STUDY].
51.  FINRA, FINRA MANUAL, R. 2111 (2014). There are, of course, exceptions. Some states
impose a fiduciary duty under common law. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Eichler, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 403 (Ct. 
App. 1985) (“The relevant law is clear. ‘The relationship between a broker and principal is fiduciary in 
nature and imposes on the broker the duty of acting in the highest good faith toward the princi-
pal.’ . . . .” (quoting Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 236 (Ct. App. 
1968)). Nevada also recently imposed a statutory fiduciary duty on Brokers consistent with the statutory 
fiduciary duty it already imposed on financial planners. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 628A.020 (1993) (“A 
financial planner has the duty of a fiduciary toward a client.”).
52.  See Christine Lazaro, Fiduciary Duty— Now and in the Future, 17 PIABA B.J. 129, 132
(2010) (“[T]he suitability standard requires that a recommendation merely be suitable for a customer, 
not necessarily that it be in the customer’s best interest.”); Patricia A. McCoy, Degrees of Intermedia-
tion, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 551, 571 (2015) (“Because the duty of suitability is not a fiduciary duty, 
securities brokers are not required to act in their clients’ best interests or diversify their portfolios . . . 
Nor must brokers avoid recommending investments that will maximize their fees if their advice is 
suitable otherwise.”).
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duty on a broker to monitor a client’s account or provide additional ad-
vice.53
2. Investment Advisers
Automated investment advice firms and many traditional financial ad-
visers register as Investment Advisers (Advisers) under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act).54 Although the statutory text does 
not explicitly create a fiduciary duty for Advisers, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that Advisers owe their clients a fiduciary duty requiring them to 
act in their client’s best interests.55 In most instances, Advisers receive 
compensation tied to a client’s assets under management.56
3. Insurance Professionals
Many insurance professionals also characterize themselves as finan-
cial advisers.57 Insurance salespersons (producers) operate under varying 
state laws, making it difficult to state what duties they may owe to their 
customers.58 For some products, insurance producers now owe duties simi-
lar to the duties owed by securities Brokers.59
II. THE POTENTIAL & PERIL OF AUTOMATED INVESTMENT ADVICE
Automated investment advice firms may accelerate the disruption of 
traditional markets for investment advice and the market for asset man-
agement and institutional intermediation.60
53.  In some instances, Brokers will owe additional duties. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813,
823 (2002) (recognizing that the broker managing a discretionary account owed fiduciary duties); Leib 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (“[T]he broker
handling a discretionary account becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense.”).
54.  See SEC, FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 50, at 16–20 (detailing state and federal Adviser
registration). 
55.  SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
56.  See SEC, FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 50, at 7.
57.  Cf. Rules and Resources, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/rules-and-resources
[https://perma.cc/9U47-NJKX] (“[B]e aware that Financial Analyst, Financial Adviser (Advisor), 
Financial Consultant, Financial Planner, Investment Consultant or Wealth Manager are generic terms or 
job titles, and may be used by investment professionals who may not hold any specific credential.”).
58.  See Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 47, at 68–71 (discussing insurance producer duties).
59.  Id.
60.  See Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 198 n.95 (“The market for institutional intermedia-
tion is the market for the services of institutional intermediaries. Institutions that manage capital com-
pete against each other.”).
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A. The Potential Disruption & Efficiency Gains
Automated investment advice firms may reshape wealth and asset 
management. Traditional firms providing wealth management services may 
struggle to preserve their profit margins while competing against automated 
investment advice firms.
1. Disruption to the Market for Investment Advice
In most instances, providing reasonable asset-allocation advice to sav-
ers is straightforward and simple. Without any ability to confidently predict 
market movements, savers should buy broadly diversified indexes.61
Despite the ease with which suitable, well-diversified portfolios may 
be constructed, traditional wealth management firms frequently charge 
excessive fees for their advice. Paul Smith, the President and CEO of the 
CFA institute, has explained that “[e]veryone knows we overcharge for 
what we do. It’s obvious.”62 Automated investment advice firms may dis-
rupt these markets and put downward pressure on fees by providing asset-
allocation assistance at a fraction of the cost of more traditional firms.63
The rise of automated investment advice does not mean that human 
advisers will stop serving clients. Competitive pressure will drive human 
advisers to embrace these automated investment advice tools to provide 
services.64 Advisers that do not embrace technology may struggle to com-
pete against advisers that use technology to manage client portfolios and 
gain the freedom to use their time to assist clients with other financial deci-
sions.65
Growth in automated investment advice services may now continue at 
exponential rates, applying increasing downward pressure on prices.66
While one observer predicted that automated investment advice firms 
61. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J.
CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007) (“If you are acting with the most rationality, you will invest in index funds, which 
hold broad baskets of securities and bonds reflecting the opportunities and risks faced by the market, 
recognizing that it is nearly impossible to pursue an active trading strategy that will beat the market 
over time.”).
62. See Steverman, supra note 43 (quoting Paul Smith).
63. See Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 221.
64. See Anne Tergesen, Robo Advisers Seen Exploding in Popularity, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 
2015, 7:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/robo-advisers-seen-exploding-in-popularity-1449860367 
[https://perma.cc/FGB4-YFXB] (quoting Michael Kites as saying that “‘in 10 years there will be two 
kinds of advisers—those who use technology and those who are out of business’”).
65. Id.
66. See Zweig et al., supra note 14 (quoting financial planner explaining that it has “‘always been 
questionable whether or not advisers were earning our money at 1% and up’” and that “‘[t]he spread’s
got too narrow’”).
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would manage $2 trillion in 2020,67 others estimate the figure may swell to 
$5 to $7 trillion by 2025.68
As financial advisers increasingly rely on automated investment ad-
vice tools to provide asset allocation assistance, many will shift away from 
collecting commission revenue in exchange for selling particular products. 
A shift away from commission-driven financial advice has been underway 
for some time because of regulatory pressure to address conflicts of inter-
est.69
2. Accelerating Change in the Institutional Intermediation Market
Changes in the delivery of financial advice drive changes in the asset 
management sector. A tremendous number of actively-managed mutual 
funds rely on traditional, commission-compensated brokerage distribution 
channels to raise capital.70 If automated investment advice firms continue 
receiving fees primarily from assets under management or fixed annual 
fees, they face less of an incentive to steer client assets toward underper-
forming actively-managed funds.71
Significant changes in asset management are underway. Shifting asset-
allocation decisions by automated investment advice firms and others have 
already begun to affect many asset managers. Investor assets increasingly 
migrate from actively-managed funds toward passively-managed funds.72
Ideally, assets will continue to migrate from active to passive management 
until active management no longer reliably loses to passive management.73
67.  EPPERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 26.
68.  Tergesen, supra note 64. 
69.  See Lisa Beilfuss, Who Is Winning with the Fiduciary Rule? Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
11, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-is-winning-with-the-fiduciary-rule-wall-street-
1502443804 [https://perma.cc/5XNM-T78H] (“Firms are pushing customers toward accounts that 
charge an annual fee on their assets, rather than commissions which can violate the [fiduciary rule].”).
70.  See Benjamin P. Edwards, Financial Advice Is a Thicket of Conflicts. Wall Street Wants to
Keep It That Way, WASH. POST. (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-
advice-is-a-thicket-of-conflicts-wall-street-wants-to-keep-it-that-way/2016/12/28/0ec72e34-c6f0-11e6-
bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.ebd28aed10a8 [https://perma.cc/E6H5-6VS9] (arguing that 
reduced reliance on commissions “would kill the incentive for financial advisers to pitch lousy products 
with embedded fees to their clients”).
71.  See Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 201 (“In the market for institutional intermediaries,
picking losers is easy—as a group, the funds that charge high fees for active management are going to 
suffer relative underperformance.”).
72.  See, e.g., Aaron Black, Legg Mason: A Survivor in the Active-Manager Massacre, WALL ST.
J. (June 18, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/legg-mason-a-survivor-in-the-active-
manager-massacre-1497817231 [https://perma.cc/CR8G-SXR7] (“So far this year, investors have
pulled tens of billions of dollars from actively managed mutual funds in favor of low-cost exchange-
traded funds.”).
73.  See Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 201 (explaining that the balance between active and
passive management should coalesce around a more efficient equilibrium).
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3. Efficiency Gains
Changes in wealth and asset management should create efficiency 
gains for society. The asset management industry now rakes in approxi-
mately $88 billion in annual fees.74 If automated investment advice firms 
and other forces move assets away from higher-fee funds, the overall cost 
of asset management should decline. As intermediaries capture a smaller 
percentage of investor assets, investor gains increase.
Economic growth may also benefit from reduced fees flowing to fi-
nancial intermediaries. Some research indicates that nations with bloated 
financial intermediation sectors experience significantly slower growth.75
Automated investment advice firms may reduce the overall amount of capi-
tal captured by financial intermediaries, freeing the capital for investment.
B. Potential Regulatory Concerns
Balancing the benefits of automated investment advice against its risks 
will require cautious regulatory engagement. Effective regulatory responses 
will require independence, as well as financial and technological literacy.76
1. Systemic Risk Regulation
The exponential growth and potential scale of automated investment 
advice firms have significant systemic implications. If increasing numbers 
of consumers allocate their assets using the same or similar automated in-
vestment algorithms, wide swaths of the population could experience high-
ly correlated losses.77 Dominant automated investment advice firms 
controlling massive market shares may also introduce new cybersecurity 
risks. If a hacker caused an automated investment advice firm to suddenly 
sell substantial assets, it could significantly disrupt markets.78
74.  MICHAEL RAWSON & BEN JOHNSON, MORNINGSTAR, 2015 FEE STUDY: INVESTORS ARE
DRIVING EXPENSE RATIOS DOWN 1 (2015), https://news.morningstar.com/pdfs/2015_fee_study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8LD4-XGW9].
75.  See Judge, supra note 16, at 575 (“[R]ecent studies suggest that the relationship between the
size of a country’s financial sector and the rate of its development is an inverted ‘U’—having a robust 
financial system is critical for economic growth, but too much finance impedes development.”).
76.  See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1310 (2017) (“Effective 
publicly run digital intermediaries would require well-funded, capture-resistant agencies committed to 
performance metrics and perhaps pushing the bounds of allowable governmental data collection.”).
77.  See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 39, at 29–30 (“[I]f the models underlying competing robo
advisors are sufficiently alike, there is a risk of highly correlated losses that could even pose systemic 
risk.”).
78.  See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1292 (2017) (“With
mass misinformation schemes, parties can manipulate the marketplace through fake regulatory filings, 
fictitious news reports, erroneous data, and hacking.”).
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Despite the potential future risks, regulators should not move over-
zealously and subject automated investment advice firms to higher stand-
ards than those currently applied to natural persons.79 Moves by regulators 
to impose excessive regulatory burdens on automated investment advice 
firms in the name of consumer protection or systemic risk reduction may 
actually be calculated to raise costs for disruptive entrants and to protect 
the profitability of existing intermediaries.80
2. Shifting Regulatory Standards
Automated investment advice firms may also face risks from shifting 
regulatory standards in the regulation of investment advice. At the present, 
automated investment advice firms face regulatory uncertainty from multi-
ple federal regulators. Changes in the federal regulatory environment may 
amplify or diminish forces supporting widespread movements to automated 
investment advice platforms.
a. The Department of Labor Rule
To address conflicts in the market for investment advice, the United 
States Department of Labor issued a rule (the Fiduciary Rule) requiring 
persons giving advice about retirement accounts to provide advice in the 
best interest of retirement savers.81 Labor’s Fiduciary Rule remains contro-
versial and the Department of Labor has begun to reconsider the rule pur-
suant to a presidential memorandum.82
While a modified or enfeebled Fiduciary Rule from the Department of 
Labor may not directly impact automated investment advice firms, the 
change to the regulatory environment may diminish the incentive for tradi-
tional financial advisers to migrate to different methods of providing ad-
vice. Without the restraint imposed by the Fiduciary Rule, many financial 
advisers may opt for the high fees obtainable by selling high-commission 
products.
79.  Baker & Dellaert, supra note 39, at 3 (“At the same time, however, it is important not to over-
react and not to set a higher bar for automated advisors than for human advisors. For now, the standard 
against which automated advisors should be compared is that of humans, whom we know are much less 
than perfect.”).
80.  See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 36–37), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2829592 
[https://perma.cc/84RW-QWT3] (“[I]t is difficult to distinguish legitimate investor protection initiatives 
from interventions designed to drive up costs for a potentially disruptive competitor.”).
81.  Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Ad-
vice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 10, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
82.  See Fiduciary Duty Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 9675 (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-07/pdf/2017-02656.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE6T-YNG8].
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b.?The Looming SEC Rulemaking
The SEC has also solicited comments about the appropriate standards 
of conduct for Advisers and brokerage firms.83 With rulemaking likely to 
ensue, automated investment advice firms will need to adapt to a changing 
regulatory environment. If the SEC leaves the current fiduciary standards in 
place for Advisers, existing automated investment advice firms may qualify 
as fiduciaries.84
3.?Conflicts
Automated investment advice firms also face conflicts of interest. Be-
cause of their potential ability to direct massive capital flows, many Wall 
Street firms will seek to influence the algorithms used to allocate funds. For 
example, plaintiffs recently filed a class action lawsuit against Morningstar 
and Prudential raising issues with an automated investment advice tool 
known as “GoalMaker.”85 Plaintiffs allege that the GoalMaker automated 
investment advice tool would “steer retirement investors . . . into high-cost 
investments that pay unwarranted fees to” Prudential.86 The complaint al-
leges that GoalMaker was presented to savers as providing “unbiased asset 
allocation modeling” even though it actually “systematically influenced 
[investors] to put their money into a variety of high-cost retirement funds 
that paid excessive fees to the Prudential Defendants.”87 If proven, these 
allegations go directly to the worst fears about automated investment ad-
vice tools.
Automated investment advice firms may face other conflicts. For ex-
ample, if their compensation derives from assets under management, they 
may hesitate to recommend wise transactions that reduce their assets under 
management. For example, if a client should acquire an insurance policy, 
an automated investment advice firm might not push the need for insurance 
as aggressively as an insurance producer would. Similarly, automated in-
vestment advice firms might recommend against paying down other debts 
that would reduce their assets under management.
83. Public Statement, Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Comments from?
Retail Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of Conduct for Investment Advisers and
Broker-Dealers (June 1, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-chairman-
clayton-2017-05-31 [https://perma.cc/PLS7-R7JK].
84. See Nicole G. Iannarone, Computer as Confidant: Digital Investment Advice and the Fiduci-
ary Standard, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. ??? (2017).
85. Class Action Complaint at 2, Green v. Morningstar, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-05652 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3,?
2017).
86.  Id.
87.  Id. at 5.
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4. Public Judicial Oversight
As automated investment advice firms capture increasing market 
share, judicial oversight remains essential. Many financial services firms 
now impose arbitration agreements and class action waivers on consum-
ers.88 If these agreements become widespread in the automated investment 
advice sector, public courts may not be presented with opportunities to 
update common law standards for a new technological context. Additional-
ly, the public would also lose the ability to discover reputational infor-
mation through public court processes. For example, if the GoalMaker 
dispute discussed above had been shunted into arbitration instead of a pub-
lic court, this article would not have had the opportunity to review the 
complaint’s allegations.
CONCLUSION
Automated investment advice firms offer significant benefits. If their 
platforms improve the delivery of high-quality, less-biased financial ad-
vice, their growth may unlock significant benefits. If these firms improve 
asset allocation and induce users to increase their savings rates, they may 
mitigate the coming retirement crisis. At the least, automated investment 
advice firms seem likely to accelerate changes in the asset management 
industry and to shift more investors toward passive investing models.
As these firms grow, regulators will need to grow their expertise and 
capabilities to provide effective oversight for these new models.89 To avoid 
unwarranted regulatory burdens, regulatory oversight should scale with the 
assets managed automated investment advice firms.90 Because rapidly au-
tomated investment advice firms already manage billions, regulators should 
fairly review their operations and devote resources to developing greater 
competency as digital regulators.91
88. See generally Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, NEV. L.J. (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3012246 [https://perma.cc/Z6JD-MDYC].
89. See generally Van Loo, supra note 76.
90. The SEC announced that it would scrutinize “robo-advisers” in its 2017 Examination Priori-
ties. SEC, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2017, at 2 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AJ8J-HFTZ].
91. See Van Loo, supra note 76, at 1323 (“To keep up, agencies will need to develop increasingly 
sophisticated and automated tools.”).
